In 1961, the “Cha-Cha-Cha” campaign of civil disobedience and political awareness began in earnest. This entailed strikes, arson, blocking of the roads, boycotts and protests in Lusaka and across the country. This campaign was named after a popular dance in the early 1960s, and symbolized that it was time for Britain to ‘face the music’ of Zambian independence.

For a long time the people had been talking of violence, of the day when they would fight the white man and win back their country - and we, the leaders... had prevailed on them to use peaceful methods. When some of us had discussed this in June, 1961, it could not be denied that our policy to achieve a non-racial state by non-violent means had achieved nothing, and that our followers were beginning to lose confidence and were developing disturbing ideas of terrorism. These words were not spoken by Kenneth Kaunda but Nelson Mandela in his frank, courageous defence at the end of the Rivonia trial in Pretoria in June 1964. But Kaunda could easily have spoken to them as he approached the Annual Conference of UNIP in July 1961. It might have been more comfortable to have ‘let sleeping dogs lie’. Despite the significant number of genuinely good people in it, the white community of South and Central Africa had in effect posted notices everywhere: 'No dogs, no natives', and Africans must be ready to have their knock answered by a sharp 'What do you want?'.

Now, for Kenneth, in the tenth year of his active association with the movement of pent-up protest, there was a fresh awareness that the awakening of his people to hope for a spiritual change in the land had raised them to their feet and that it would be easy now for someone to call them to surge forward recklessly with sticks and stones to claim their heritage. If he stayed with these people of his who were 'no band of angels', he would be blamed for every incident of indiscipline. Somehow, since his friend Iain Macleod had not been able to master the powerful machinations of Welensky and his numerous allies, the five points of the 'Master Plan' would now have to be rendered in terms more practical than those he had enunciated in Kitwe, so that, hoping against hope, justice might still be done without the shedding of blood. He knew the situation might force him to hand over to more 'tough' leadership, but as long as his people would hear he would appeal to their deep humanity; for the new nation would need all the flexibility of heart, all the reasonableness, all the mercy of all its people, to grow and prosper.

As the South African ANC faced its crisis of non-violence versus violence for violence and the Congo continued to be haunted by the ghost of the murdered Patrice Lumumba and to erupt in strife and panic, the Central African conflict was aptly summarised by Southern Rhodesia's former Prime Minister, Garfield Todd, whose role as a spokesman of white sympathisers with the African cause was increasingly significant in the colony. 'Intimidation takes many forms,' he said 'and while it is at its crudest in petrol bomb, it is no less undesirable in the call-up of the armed forces to "maintain law and order" when the peace is threatened simply because a racial minority refuses to abrogate its privilege. The Rhodesia which Joshua Nkomo had at first accepted and then rejected. It was encouraging to African political leaders that in Kenya Jomo Kenyatta was being moved step by step from ignominious imprisonment to political supremacy, and Julius Nyerere as now Prime Minister in Tanganyika. But the situation of Southern Africa was likely to wield a greater influence on Central African affairs than that of either East or West Africa. Mozambique and Angola,
under severe news censorship, were increasingly experiencing tremors of protest and repression.

What seemed so ominous in the latest formula from London for Rhodesia was that it was placing ‘apartheid on the Statue Book’. UNIP’s London Committee, in its *Voice of Zambia*, pointed out that ‘where a constituency is racially reserved for a European and an African, the candidates’ names would be “arranged in two separate sections on the ballot paper”’, and that the votes of white and black voters on the Upper and Lower Rolls respectively would have to be checked according to race. ‘What is to be the definition of “European” and “African”? the paper asked. ‘If the definition is to be based on some unscientific criterion of racial purity, what are the tests proposed?... In recent years, Dr. Verwoerd has been classifying people racially by tests such as these: whether a pencil placed in a person’s hair falls out or not on bending over; width of nose; shade of whiteness; purity of ancestry; opinion of neighbours; and many other obnoxious tests. Are these now to be applied in our country... [and] to persons who have escaped the South African tests by migrating to our country?... Racial classification is not a matter to be taken lightly - it is a sign of Apartheid in its advanced stage. Great personal tragedies are to be expected in the short run and irreversible racial thinking engendered in the long. The London news sheet also printed, in the same issue, a poem, by Bakali Koshikabila, entitled ‘Northern Rhodesia, Awake’.

On his journey back to Lusaka, Keneth Kaunda had to make the inevitable air stop at Salisbury. Though as a prohibited immigrant he was not allowed to leave the airport, he was subjected to an exhaustive search which he described as worse than any humiliation he had suffered in his life. He would now, he cried, ‘declare practical war’ on the Federation. The notes of his address to the Party Conference at Mulungushi, the text of his joint declaration with Joshua Nkomo and a letter from a friendly British Labour M.P. had been seized. Lying on the lawn at the airport with Nkomo, he told reporters that the coming struggle in his country would be ‘non-violent—something to make the working of the Federation impossible.’ ‘They will not have our cooperation any more. ... I am fighting the British Government. ... But I want a clean fight.’ He did not want Whitehall to be able to claim that he had not understood the issue. He was now sure that the modified 15-15-15 scheme was ‘weighted very much in favour of white candidates’. In this baleful conviction, he issued a sharp press statement during a brief stop in Ghana. Because of this crisis, he was cancelling invitations to nationalist leaders in Tanganyika, Kenya, Nyasaland, Basutoland, Southern Rhodesia and Bechuanaland to attend UNIP’s Annual Conference. ‘As a precaution we have already sent Party emissaries to the district warning people not to squander their month’s earnings or savings on frivolous commodities.’

When he rose to speak to the three thousand Party delegates on 9 July, at Mulungushi, he began with a note of ringing confidence: ‘Countrymen, we meet today to decide the future of our country.’ Right away he explained the absence of Chiefs, ‘our natural rulers’. ‘I am conscious of the danger to which we would expose them if we invited them to come here. I am glad to tell you that we have overwhelming support from them, although intimidation from those above them will often make some of them not say so. ... I thank God for waking up this wide mass awakening among His people. ... We are poverty stricken in the midst of plenty. Bus and other fares are fantastically high. Yet we have here three thousand delegates and official observers. ... Congratulations, countrymen.’ Then in a long, complicated speech, he attempted to explain the
mathematical intricacies of Macleod’s scheme and the subtle alteration of it demanded by Welensky’s agents. Yet, he said: ‘in my mind’s eye I can still see Mr. Macleod’s face. It is a trustworthy face in so far as I am able to discern faces and read other people’s minds. Many fellow colonial leaders have told me the same thing. What then has gone wrong with him over Northern Rhodesia? . . . I know Colonial Secretary Macleod is adept at bridge. But we are not breathless pieces of paper on a bridge table. We are human beings who, if they will not play bridge, at least will know what is right or wrong for themselves whether it be political, economic, social or cultural.’ The situation was rendered the more critical by the ‘full military and police preparations ... in the Union of South Africa, in this rotten Federation ... in Angola and Mozambique’ and by the military pacts being made ‘between these three foreign powers,’ but the people must respond in courage. Here he quoted ‘that great English genius’, Shakespeare from Julius Caesar: ‘You must note beside That we here tried the utmost of our friends, Our legions are brimful, our cause is ripe. The enemy increaseth every day, We, at the height, are ready to decline. There is a tide in the affairs of men Which, taken at the flood leads on to fortune; Omitted, all the voyage of their life Is bound in shallows and in miseries. On such a full sea are we now afloat And we must take the current when it serves, Or lose our ventures.’ ‘We are ready,’ said Kaunda, ‘not to decline but to march forward equipped with the only weapon I know will do here—the positive and creative force of NON-VIOLENCE.’ Towards the end of his speech, he gave special messages to European, Asian and EuroAfrican ‘friends and comrades in the struggle’, all of whom had to face difficulties by aligning themselves with the African cause. ‘Our country at this hour needs brave ones,’ he declared. ‘Stand up and be brave.’ He had, he concluded, demanded that the British Government should announce the new Constitution before 8 July. ‘They have done so, but it is completely unacceptable to us of your National Council at least. I have always asked you to be PATIENT, NON-VIOLENT IN THOUGHT, WORD and DEED. I am removing one of the noble words from my vocabulary and it is PATIENCE. . . . What is important is, although I remove PATIENCE ... we shall remain strictly non-violent in thought, word and deed. ... If you refuse to recognise the new constitution, we will have to act in a positive but non-violent way . . . [and] I shall be obliged to ask for powers to send myself as well as others to jail.’ As Kenneth Kaunda was speaking, there were repeated shouts of approval and again and again the word ‘Cha-cha-cha’ was heard. It was the name of a popular community dance, and it could perhaps be interpreted as meaning: ‘Face the music.’ There were many questions about ‘Cha-cha-cha’ at Mulungushi. Someone asked Kaunda whether there was a book in which he had read about it, but he replied that ‘it was written in his head’, and added in laughter, ‘If you wish to open my head you will see where it is written.’ Perhaps Welensky thought that ‘cha-cha-cha’ was ‘political agitation’ only, but he was wrong. ‘Cha-cha-cha means real dancing. Europeans will take part along with Africans.’ ‘Young children and those unborn will join in the dance,’ he said. ‘Hens, dogs and all our domestic beasts will join in. Yes, even the Queen will
also dance Cha-cha-cha. Cha-cha-cha is for all.’ It was to come to mean that
the action would go on till victory was won; the whole community, as it were,
dancing together in unison, refusing to be silenced. But Kaunda, again clad in
his Ghana-type toga, spoke at several points under considerable emotional
strain, at once point crying, ‘Dear God, in the past I have appealed to my
people to be patient, non-violent and dignified.’ ‘What shall I tell them now?
And if I tell them to be patient and non-violent, will they listen to me? . . .’ ‘We
will witness the madness of man,’ he exclaimed, near to tears, ‘when he kills
his fellow man because he is of a different colour.’
The round timber dais was surrounded with placards, some carried by children,
with texts more in tune with Sipalo’s thinking than with Kaunda’s: ‘Quit Africa,
all white men’ and ‘No room for white settlers’. It was at this Conference that,
for the first time, there were angry shouts of ‘No more non-violence’ as he was
speaking, and he had to plead to be allowed to explain his policy further. Civil
disobedience in the form of non-cooperation had been going on for some time,
which had generally meant, in the rural areas, the ignoring of District
Commissioners’ calls to Boma meetings and of instructions of agricultural and
other officers. Now something more was expected and, according to Kaunda,
the ‘Master Plan’ was being spoken of before it had been formulated.
The people ‘had to give a demonstration of strength but we did not know what
action would be called for’. Moreover, from the outset, he had sought to
promote the initiative of local Party leadership rather than of a centralised
authority. He has recorded how, during 1961 when he had to travel abroad
extensively ‘the local chaps did most of the work, like Alex Shapi and Sylvester
Chise-mbele in Luapula, in the north Mutemba, in the north-west Hanock
Kikombe and Mateyo Ngalande, etc.’ Grey Zulu, a member of the Central
Committee where ‘non-violence’ had been hotly debated, recalled that, as he
bade delegates farewell, Kenneth spoke movingly about the possibility of some
dying in the coming struggle. ‘Those who believe in God believe sincerely that
we will meet in heaven as people who died for a just cause. To the few of you
who die so that others should live in peace after you, it gives a great challenge
that you should not kill anyone, for then you would be in the same boat as
those who kill us.’

Convinced that it was ‘the intention of the British Government . . . to foster
white oligarchy at the expense of three million African people’, the Mulungushi
Conference finally resolved as follows:

‘(1) That the United National Independence Party on behalf of the people of
Zambia totally rejects the “Macleod” constitutional proposals;
(2) That the United National Independence Party regard the said constitutional
proposals as an insult to the people of Zambia, both Black and White, and an
insulting betrayal to the policy of negotiation hitherto carried out on behalf of
the people by their leader Kenneth Kaunda;
(3) That from now on United National Independence Party will carry on a bitter
struggle to attain full independence for the people of Zambia and we call upon
the people to rally to the cause of freedom in order to ensure that the present
constitutional proposals cannot be implemented;
(4) That time has come for United National Independence Party to revise the
method of our struggle for freedom and independence and to find the means
which the British Government will understand and obey;
(5) That to these ends this Conference, representative of all the three million
African people of Zambia and thousands of members of other races, hereby
grants the . President of the United National Independence Party emergency
powers to direct and supervise all operations for a lively and effective positive action campaign now;
(6) That these powers should include the following:
(a) Authority to call on any individual to perform any task at any time and at a second’s notice.
(b) Authority to call, halt, prolong or suspend any campaign in any part of Northern Rhodesia;
(c) Authority to appoint special committees.
(7) We the 4,000 delegates do hereby dedicate ourselves individually and collectively to the spirit and letter of this resolution in its entirety.’

Meanwhile ANC’s campaign against Kaunda as a ‘Nyasalander* continued unabated, with charges that he was making himself rich from his visits to America, and that the funds received by UNIP from the All-Africa Peoples’ Conference in Cairo were ‘Communistic’. ANC’s Week by Week had asked why ‘Kaunda (Mau Mau) (some call him Zombie because of his primitive hairdo)’ should qualify to meet the President of the United States. Small but ugly inter-party clashes around Lusaka had confirmed that such enmity was on the increase. Meanwhile, within UNIP itself there were fresh manifestations of dissension and a major crisis blew up at Mulungushi, over the anger of various delegates at the ‘drunkeness’ [szc] of Munu Sipalo, the National Secretary. In consequence, Mainza Chona was appointed as Acting Secretary and so became Editor of the Voice of UNIP. The censure motion was hurriedly drafted in view of Kaunda’s decision to hold unscheduled elections, thus sparing Sipalo the ignominy of dismissal.

In recent months there had been, as we have seen, a great increase in the activity of UNIP’s agents throughout the country and in areas like the Luapula and Northern Provinces, singing and dancing had been a feature of Party gatherings for some time. The Regional Women’s Secretary for the Luapula had described how in Kazembe’s area there was widespread suspicion that the Chief was working for the Boma by warning other Chiefs that the political leaders wanted to ‘grab’ their positions and ‘declare themselves chiefs’. In reaction, UNIP’s local organisation was intensified and people went about singing Party songs.

‘Father Kaunda, Father Kaunda,
It’s you we follow
In this journey of ours to freedom.
It is not war we want (bis)
We want the country,
There is no offence in that.’
Another song went like this:
‘Never mind that the laws
Seem so harsh against us:
We shall go on meeting,
We shall not fear imprisonment,
Because all these will be testimonies
When we are free, when we are free!
Mothers and Fathers,
What are you thinking
Of this land we live in?
You say it belongs to the Incomer.
Come here and let us understand
That, like our friends in Ghana,
We’re about to be free (bis)!
Yet another struck a more bellicose note
See, we received those
Who brought us weapons
So that we could kill them all.
In our land we are the owners.
God was not stupid
To make a black man.
This is why we’re calling you all—
Come, let us fight for our country.’

Political songs were, of course, not new to the country. They can be traced back to the early days of forced labour and conscripted porterage. For some years now, the cry of the songs had been for democracy, about which British wartime propaganda had talked so confidently. So people had been singing:
‘When talking about democracy
We must teach these Europeans,
Because they do not know.
See, here in Africa they bring their clothes,
But leave democracy in Europe.
(Chorus) Go back, go back
And bring true democracy.
We are no longer asleep,
We are up and about democracy.
We have known for a long time
We are the majority, and we demand
A majority in the Legislative Council.’

Because the colour bar begot a language barrier, such songs had often been sung with impunity when white men were near. But now, as in Nyasaland in 1959, the shout of ‘Kwacha—the dawn is come’ or ‘Freedom’ and the singing of such songs were regarded as seditious. Such shouts were now heard as incidents of violence took place, immediately after the Mulungushi Conference. A U.F.P. member of Leg. Co. had just described UNIP’s leaders as ‘scum of the earth’, but such a remark was heard now, not simply as ‘the way Europeans talk’, but as bitter provocation. In various regions of the country, the party was declaring a boycott of beer halls, partly to promote sobriety as a vital part of popular organisation. There was immediately a number of ‘crude attempts at sabotage by the UNIP Youth League on the. Copperbelt’, while the increased movement of police and military vehicles in the Luapula province was answered by the ditching of a number of bridges on the main roads.

In a letter to ‘Dear Freedom Fighters’ in the Voice of UNIP, Mainza Chona wrote:
‘You are all standing at attention waiting for the green light to the MASTER PLAN. Some of you are tired of waiting. . . . [At] the Mulungushi Conference . . . you were told to be “ON YOUR MARKS, GET SET” . . . But you remember you gave emergency powers to the National President. . . . who alone is responsible for directing CHACHACHA. This means that he is to blame if the campaign fails. So he has to make a careful assessment . . . before he can give the word “Go”.’

Chona ended with a grave word on the coming struggle. ‘There will be many arrests, many trials, many imprisonments and many appeals. Try to obtain bail on your own recognizance; but if a sum of money is demanded it is no use looking to the Party for help. Just sit in custody. There will probably be thousands like you.’

UNIP reports of the first wave of incidents after Mulungushi listed sixty people
arrested at Kitwe in a pre-dawn raid and quoted a press notice of the death of an ANC official who had been organising opposition to the beer hall boycott there. Chisembele had at the same time cabled UNIP headquarters from the Luapula Province to report ‘police provocation’ and ask a national official to go north ‘to calm the people’. Bridges had been destroyed and ‘many people were arrested’. Southern Province officials alleged police bribery of ANC members to block the beer hall boycott, which however was ‘completely effective’ in the Lusaka region. Relations between Party officials and ‘the authorities’ in Barotseland were ‘reasonably fair’. In the Eastern Province, UNIP was battling against ANC attempts to persuade people to register as voters under the new Constitution; and it was alleged that the District Commissioner of Petauke, finding that the Chiefs thought that the requirement of the Constitution for a candidate to win 12% of the votes cast was too high, had suggested that it ‘could be reduced to 1 of the votes cast’! From Solwezi in the north-west came a report of a police raid on the UNIP office. In the Northern Province where Kenneth Kaunda was touring, troubles had been reported in Chinsali and the Lungu Chief near Abercorn had, ‘as an agent of imperialism’, forbidden Kaunda’s entry into his area. Everywhere he went on this 3,000-mile pilgrimage, Kenneth appealed insistently for ‘non-violence’. But without physical violence to persons, the thousands of Party members and their allies, in the Northern and Luapula Provinces, were beginning what was in effect a sabotage campaign without awaiting a direct order from their President. When Chona was asked, on 27 July if these first outbreaks were part of the ‘Master Plan’, he replied, ‘I really don’t know,’ while Kaunda himself ‘called unsuccessfully for a stop to the violence, conceding that the disturbances “looked organized”’. Kaunda was convinced after his tour, that the mood of the north was bitter. When at Mpika, he had been wakened at 4 a.m. to find a number of Chiefs and other senior people dancing and singing a battle song near where he had slept which said clearly: ‘War is near.’ This made him insist even more strongly ‘that there was to be no movement at all’ until he gave the word. This instruction was communicated personally to all provincial leaders. But somehow the trigger was pulled before the order was given and it was when he was at Dar es Salaam that a correspondent of the London Daily Mail in Lusaka called him with the question, ‘Have you heard what is happening at home?’ ‘I said, “No. No,”’ Kaunda recalled, ‘and he said, “They are burning their ICs. Is that in order?”’ Then I said, “Yes, this is the first part of the Master Plan.”’ At this point it is important now to sketch the pattern of events, mainly in the two northerly regions of the territory, as seen by people living there. Many witnesses were explicit in the view that they ‘liked’ Kaunda’s leadership ‘because there was no bloodshed in his way of fighting for our freedom’, in consequence of which ‘all constituency officials were going around stopping people from taking up weapons such as stones or damaging roads or bridges. . . ‘On several occasions, we tended to force him against his nonviolence policy but because of his strictness and straightforwardness, we were calmed.’ In the Samfya area, where there had been early disenchantment with Nkumbula’s leadership and where first ZANC and then UNIP had gained a very large following, local testimony indicates that the mass burning of ifitupa, as African Identification Certificates were called, was done five days before Kaunda burned his own ichitupa in Lusaka, probably because some delegates returning from Mulungushi had broken their pledge of secrecy. The burning at Samfya was followed the next day by similar action on the island of Chishi, and
there too people testified that the burning of ifitupa and of imichato or Marriage Certificates was symbolic of a radical rejection of foreign rule.

‘This time,’ said Mama Chola of Mwense, ‘we realised that Cha-cha-cha had started. . . . ‘Straightaway we started collecting Identification and Marriage Certificates, even from those who did not attend the meeting, and we visited the homes of all the elderly people who had not come because of the cold weather. They surrendered heaps and heaps of certificates, and when it struck 2 a.m., we set these ablaze. . . . We were then instructed to ask young children to collect the ashes of the burnt things and take them to the D.O. sent by Welensky and tell him we had burned the ifitupa to show that we did not like his government. If we sent adults they would be fired at. . . . From all over the place our fellow citizens, like the Watchtowers who did not join the struggle because of fear, came along with the Boma Messengers to see what we were doing.... Then they muttered among themselves, “Is this the Cha-cha-cha Kaunda has been speaking of? A Cha-cha-cha of happiness?” .... When the youngsters reached the Boma, “These people are mad,” said the D.O. ... He looked at the children and caught them by the ears, demanding to know who had sent them to his office with the ashes. “It is President Kaunda who has sent us,” they told him. Then they arrested the youngsters, shook them and then separated them to try to force them to name those responsible. But the children simply repeated: “President Kaunda sent us. . . .“ He then despatched police and they began beating the people.* Mama Chola, like other witnesses, gave the names and villages of a number of people who had been arrested or beaten by the Government forces. Men and women prisoners, she said, were made to walk naked. More than two hundred arrests were made. At Samfya, the burning of ifitupa was concluded by the burial of a large heap of ashes and the erection of a rough wooden cross at the spot near the UNIP Constituency Office with the inscription, ‘Here we have buried Welensky today.’

From all the affected areas evidence was given of a variety of brutalities by the security forces, including assault and outrage upon women, which was recalled with special horror, as well as torture of men by the suspension of stones on their private parts, and by making them run and dance, naked, in this condition. In this respect, the testimony of a Scottish missionary of the United Church corroborated the indiscriminate violence which had been so marked a feature of the ‘pacification’ of northern Malawi during the 1959 Emergency. He and his family, returning to Lubwa, Chinsali, from the north, encountered various road blocks and then found a stationary lorry loaded with people, roped hand and foot like bundles. He was shocked to see a white officer kicking some of them off the lorry. ‘That kind of thing makes you boil inside,’ he recorded later, ‘and you don’t know how to react at first.’ On reaching Chinsali District, they found that, wherever there was a road block, the security forces swept into the villages nearest to it and started terrorising the people. No effort was made to ascertain people’s political involvement, ‘like Andrew and Susanna, for example, people I knew at Mundu.’ ‘Andrew was dragged from his house, thrashed, kicked, beaten about the body. His wife hung on to one of the posts of the house because she knew that if she was dragged away, they would burn the house down.’ Not far from Mundu, ‘there was a man who was a storekeeper.’ ‘His wife was dragged out and then pushed into the room again. I don’t personally have any doubts about what happened then because the woman was a changed person thereafter. She had been the brightest woman in our local congregation, but now she changed completely and became depressed, ashamed to see anyone.’ As he moved southwards towards the
court of Chief Chibesakunda, the missionary found that ‘a terrific amount of damage’ had been done at Matumbo by the police and army. ‘The village was practically razed and the girls were raped, without any doubt.’ Many of the men in the area had gone to live in camps in the forest, which were surrounded by booby traps in case of an attack by soldiers. These men roamed at large by day, ‘chanting UNIP slogans in bands of up to 1,000 strong, through the bush’. The security forces therefore terrorised the women and old people who remained in the villages. ‘There was for example the old man who came into Lubwa hospital, suffering from shock. He had been in a village a few miles north of Chinsali when the Mobile Unit had come, burned the village and started picking up everything they could. . . . The Mobile Unit boys did just what they wanted, they could take food, pick up all the chickens, take away the cattle. This old man happened to be the proud possessor of one cow, but as he ran away and hid, he could see his cow being slaughtered and dumped into a lorry. He saw his house burnt down, his wife beaten . . . and it just shattered him. . . . He walked into hospital in a dazed condition and was there quite a long time. He just could not be orientated again. He had lost his bearings.’

As we saw above, there had been some acts of arson against village schools in 1960. Now a considerable number of schools were burned and the testimony of village people varied substantially on this matter. Some claimed that, like the stealing and killing of cattle and the destruction of grain bins, it was done by the security forces or their agents to shatter the whole fabric of life by way of ‘punishing’ the populace. Others, including the Lubwa missionary, believed that the people, in the unanimity of their protest, regarded the blocking of roads and damaging of bridges as inadequate. ‘Everything that was N.R.G. therefore had to be battered. Buckets, brooms, anything with the Government stamp’. The missionary recorded, however, that before a school was set ablaze, all the Bibles were removed and stacked safely away from the fire. The imposition of community fines had the effect of increasing solidarity and convincing the people that it was a ‘war of the Government’ against the African population. In the words of one witness, ‘We did not approve of anything of the Government, not even of its institutions, like the schools.’ ‘We only wanted to achieve self-government. Then we would build our own schools and send our children to them. We would replace them with better ones, just as in our Bemba proverb: “Nga twakana umuntu ifwe, twakana no twakwe—” “If we reject a man, we reject also what is his.” ’ Inevitably, however, such a unanimous resolve ‘to do something in their own right’ evoked in turn bitter and indiscriminate anger against the people on the part of otherwise benevolent persons. The Scots missionary told of one such, the senior police officer at Chinsali, an Irishman, who had once given £100, ‘the biggest donation we had ever received’, for a church building, and who did numerous acts of charity near the Boma. The wave of popular unrest made him feel that he had somehow ‘been let down’, and he left Chinsali embittered. The fact that the names of white officers were often misheard and mispronounced by the local people, while almost all the people were unknown by name or face to the expatriates who operated ‘law and order’, further aggravated the tragedy.

If the position of well-meaning white officials was painful, that of many of the Chiefs was far more parlous. ‘You Chiefs,’ their people told them, ‘when you see a white man you leave your chair and go and sit on the ground, you let a stranger occupy the chair of a Chief.’ ‘You do not realise what you are doing…. We shall show you real freedom when Dr. Kaunda, through God’s will, gets this
freedom for us.’ This anger against the subservience of some Chiefs was widespread. ‘On August 27th,’ Headman Kata- mbarara of Lundazi District recalled, ‘I went out with Humphrey Mulemba and burned the local court... to show that we were taking our country back. . . . Cha-cha-cha was the end of fear. . . . We rejoiced because we were on the road to peace.’

When Kenneth Kaunda made his extended tour of the north, he had made his public speeches in the presence of Government officials. At Chinsali, according to the evidence of his brother, Robert, the D.C. and his D.O. both attended a mass rally at the Boma and heard Kaunda’s explanation of the crisis and his appeal for ‘non-violent positive action’. His last words were: ‘If I were to order you, my people in Chinsali District, to go to the east, beyond the hills, and pull down those hills and cut down the forests, would you do just that?’ This was greeted by ‘a resounding YES’. ‘And if I led you to the north or to the west, would you still follow me?’ ‘Yes,’ they roared back, ‘we will follow you.’ ‘We will do whatever you ask us to do.’ ‘Now, I have finished addressing you’, Kaunda said, ‘Stay well.’ He was clearly under great tension, believing that the whole movement of political change must depend on local leadership, yet realising that so explosive a situation demanded not less than military authority, unsupported by arms, to prevent chaos. As crowds everywhere shouted ‘Kaunda, Kaunda’ and the exuberant scribes of the Voice wrote his name in every issue, with acclamations of ‘Choba-e, Kaunda, Choba-e’, Bemba for ‘helmsman’, the movement was assuming an increasingly religious fervour. ‘O God’, the people sang, ‘Behold our sufferings.’

‘What have we done against you, our Saviour?
This we know, O God,
That we are in the ditch.
But you give to each who asks
And you are our redeemer.
Come and redeem us, O God,
From everlasting bondage.
This place, brethren,
God has given us.
There is a great good fortune
Ahead for you and for us.
Let them stop mocking us,
Let them stop hating us,
Though we sing praise to our land
And comfort those who suffer,
Those who are in jail.
Fathers and sisters,
Cast away the fear inside you.
Welensky, see this land is our land!
Rejoice and be glad.’

Therefore the roads must be blocked, the bridges ditched, the telephone cables cut, the cattle pens destroyed, the Government officials, police and soldiers harassed and given no rest, until, as they said, ‘Tukapoka ubuteko’—‘We shall take over the Government.’ For ‘Cha-cha-cha didn’t start in 1961, but long before’, building up in peoples’ heart until the pent-up protest had to burst forth, till ‘the Government must look and realise that the people are really angry. “If we kill them, they won’t listen. So let us now acknowledge that they must rule themselves. . . Moreover, we heard another report that the Governor Hone in Lusaka was well-disposed towards our freedom, really helping
President Kaunda’, which added impetus to the hope of early victory. Though Kaunda’s flying visit to London on 13 August was to make ‘a last appeal’, he was determined to keep open the channels of communication with both the Governor and the Colonial Secretary; and they too were anxious to avoid a final breach. At Ndola on his way back from England via Dar es Salaam, he had said that if things were ‘not very hot yet’ he was coming ‘to make them hotter’. These words recalled, in the minds of his opponents, Hastings Banda’s words, in November 1958, about having ‘the whole of Nyasaland on fire’. The next day he publicly burned his own ichitupa in the presence of about twenty pressmen outside UNIP’s Freedom House in Lusaka. Dropping its ashes into a metal waste paper container, he cried, ‘God bless Africa.’ He could calm the people of the north, he declared, if he was allowed to go there ‘as a free man’ and not ‘as a Government stooge’. Invoking the Preservation of Public Security Regulations, the Government had proscribed UNIP in the two turbulent provinces, and this meant that Kaunda could not go there as Party President. As the death toll in the north mounted, he cabled Pandit Nehru of India, begging him to initiate international action to ‘stop the killing of Africans and the mass uprooting of villages’, and sent a telegram to Prime Minister Macmillan demanding a commission of inquiry into the disturbances. In view of the ferocity of Government action, he said, ‘I cannot go on blindly with our original plan.* ‘I must now plan to meet the changing circumstances.’ Within a few days, he was back in Britain, this time to take part in a Conference on World Tensions in Oxford, where he met delegates from Africa, Asia, South and North America and Europe.

While Kenneth was in London, stressing his commitment to ‘non-violence’ despite the increasing difficulty of maintaining it, his wife Betty was busy with household chores and awaiting the birth of their seventh child. Kenneth had put up a special prayer for the coming birth, saying, before he left for London, ‘Please, Providence, may I find a baby girl born of this woman.’ ‘She has been waiting for one for so long.’ He had arranged for his mother-in-law to stay in Lusaka while he was away. ‘One morning,’ Betty has recalled, ‘as I was sitting with my mother, a man came cycling very fast....’ ‘He was one of the most active [UNIP] members and used to go on tours with my husband. ... He started sobbing. . . . “The President, Mr. Kaunda, has been poisoned in the United Kingdom” he said. “Poison was put in his food and he is very ill.” ’ Though newspapers carried a report of Kenneth’s illness, Betty was soon reassured that it was only mild food-poisoning; and a few days later, Kenneth was on his way back to Lusaka, to find their first little girl, Musata, safely born. His talks in London, though still ‘inconclusive’ and ‘secret’, had obviously kept the door open. A final breakdown would force the implementation of the third stage of the ‘Master Plan’; the burning of Identification Certificates and the destruction of roads and bridges having been the first two stages. In fact, the Plan had miscarried as the first three stages had been synchronised; namely, the burning of certificates, the closure of schools and the destruction of roads and bridges. For, according to Kaunda, ‘we didn’t have stage four or stage five.’ He had been encouraged by having access in London not only to Iain Macleod but also to his Minister of State, Lord Perth, and to the Commonwealth Relations Secretary, Duncan Sandys, though UNIP headquarters had told him not to seek any such meetings at that time. The British Ministers declared their willingness, on the cessation of violence, ‘to consider representations on divergence of views about details of the proposed Constitution’. This, Kenneth said, in Nairobi, would ‘spell new hope for our troubled country,’ and the
London Voice of Zambia reported that he had decided ‘to suspend our campaign of protest and try once more to make the British Government see reason. . . .’ Tn Mr. Kaunda,’ said the newssheet, ‘the British people as well as the people of all races in Northern Rhodesia . . . have not only their best friend but also their last friend.’

The disturbances that had erupted in August dragged on into September. Kaunda noted on many occasions that, as Hall put it, ‘the “insurgents” never attacked Europeans except in clashes with the security forces.’ ‘At Missions for instance,’ said Kaunda, ‘there were no clashes at all, yet sometimes missionaries were very isolated.’ ‘It was a real success story.’ But he was deeply perturbed by news of hunted men living in secret forest camps. ‘We began to fear that something like Mau Mau might begin if we didn’t handle this quickly and properly; for they might have stayed in the bush almost for ever’; and as he said in retrospect, ‘if you drive an animal into a corner and torment it, you may expect that, in its fear and rage, it will slash back at you.’28 The animosities within the land were sharply illustrated by Chona’s article in the August Voice of UNIP: ‘A European,’ he wrote, ‘spends 3/- a day feeding his dog . . . per month, £4.10.0d. . . .’ ‘A dog does not work. . . . Yet many of you who work for Europeans receive £3 or less per month.... Nothing will make this situation for you nice.... It is for you to decide to be free.’ The burning of 64,000 ifitupa, as estimated by the Voice, signalised such a surge of liberation: ‘No majority, no tax.’

In October Kenneth was able to start visiting the northern districts. Over 2,600 people had been arrested, and he found nervousness everywhere. At Mwense, as Mama Chola remembered it, his visit had a dramatic effect. ‘The people lined up on the road cheering and chanting political songs. But the Messengers, the police, the Mobile Unit and the Europeans ran and sought refuge’ in a Government building. As he approached, women beat their breasts in lamentation. ‘We asked how he had not been killed, but he said he was safe and alive. We assured him that even though we had been beaten, as long as he was safe, everything was all right. While he was still in the car, police and Messengers began to come to greet him. We wanted to stop them but the President said, “No, let me greet them.” ‘ Kaunda paid a visit then to Mwata Kazembe, the Luunda Chief, and then came and spoke to the crowd. ‘We shall get freedom sooner than expected,’ he said. ‘The most important thing is to do what I tell you. If I say, “Let’s dance,” just dance. If I say, “Let’s sing,” just sing. . . . You, Messengers and policemen, do not threaten your brothers and sisters. When we get our freedom, we are not going to dismiss you from your jobs. . . . We shall be leaders only because we are elected. So please do not threaten my people. As soon as I get back the country, I shall simply say to you “Right about turn” and you will turn and follow me. . . . These very people you are threatening and beating are the people who are going to save you. . . . And if you adopt cleaner methods, I shall be able to adopt mild ways of gaining independence without the shedding of blood. Then we shall lead people to peace, stability, unity and understanding.’

Chinsali had been the scene of some of the worst violence. In addition to the incidents cited by the Scots missionary at Lubwa, many other testimonies exist of barbarous actions against people who did not themselves use violence against persons. The wanton destruction of granaries posed the threat of severe hunger. But one of the worst incidents was associated with the forest of Chibuba or Mwaba wa Nkulungwe, to the west of Lubwa on the road to the Chambeshi River. In a sharp encounter with soldiers, a number of people fled
into this forest. ‘The security forces fired into it and stopped others from going into it. So these people died and rotted there.’ UNIP’s document, A Grim Peep into the North, which we shall consider later, added that ‘aeroplanes machine-gunned the villages.’

When Kaunda reached Chinsali, the ban on meetings was in force and he was anxious not to cause more suffering by letting people gather. However, he sent a private message to Lubwa asking if he might greet the church elders. The missionary agreed readily and arranged that, after Kenneth and he had had a drink of orange juice, they would meet the elders in the small domestic science room. But they found no one there and then realised that a large number of bicycles was stacked outside the large church building nearby. The church was packed, but absolutely quiet. ‘Kaunda said, “This is very awkward, even in the church”’, but, said the missionary, ‘I told him it would be all right. He could talk to them in a worshipful way and I would say a prayer and we could sing a hymn and have a Bible reading. He spoke very, very well. ... I was listening very carefully to find out whether he was going to be a rabble-rouser. His line was: “We have made our point, people are beginning to understand. Now let’s keep organised. Let’s keep our oneness ... and let’s not destroy what we’re doing by bitterness and strife. ...”.’ He spoke for about an hour and you could have heard a pin drop. ... At the end he said, “Now we’re going to disperse. ... I don’t want any mob outside the church, no open-air meeting or demonstration of any kind.”’ The next day, however, the primary school Head Master was suspended for allegedly having allowed pupils to attend a meeting, and the missionary was forbidden to leave Lubwa.

In those days, it was not only the affairs of the territory that were concerning Kenneth. On 17 September, Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary-General of the United Nations Organisation, had been killed in a mysterious air crash over Ndola as fighting raged around Elizabethville in the Congo’s secessionist province of Katanga. ‘I wept publicly,’ said Kenneth, ‘because this man, committed to world peace, had died on our territory.’ Immediately the London Voice of Zambia stated that ‘Welensky ... had invited Tshombe to Northern Rhodesia and hatched a conspiracy that shortly led to the ruthless murder of Dag.’ Sir Roy sued the paper for libel but, on receipt of an abject public apology, six months later, dropped the action, promising to give the damages awarded to him to charity. Even more sinister than the U.N. Secretary’s death, however, was the flow of mercenaries through the Protectorate into Katanga. The wooing of Lawrence Katilungu by those U.F.P. members who now realised that they could not afford to ignore Africans was increasing anxiety about the Katanga situation because of suspicions that ANC would be ready to associate inextricably with Tshombe and Welensky in a potentially anti-UNIP alliance. ANC’s Berrings Lombe had announced some months earlier, that Tshombe had promised to give Congress ‘a fleet of Land Rovers’. In the midst of this tangle of intrigue, Kaunda found himself obliged to apologise publicly to London for the statement of UNIP’s delegation to a Conference of non-aligned nations in Belgrade in September that ‘a well-planned genocide operation is being conducted against three million innocent and unarmed Africans of Northern Rhodesia by the European settlers of the country with the paternal sanction of the British Government.’ The security forces, Kaunda said, had been guilty of ‘arson, plundering and atrocities’ which Britain should investigate. But the charge of genocide was wrong. Despite his apology, however, some UNP leaders, according to the press, continued to publicise what they regarded as evidence of a plan to decimate the African population.
The Northern Rhodesian Christian Council, meanwhile, despite the Governor’s assurance that the June proposals were ‘irrevocable’, now issued a call for a general conference of political leaders, which Kaunda at once supported. The stirring of Christian leaders was welcome, but he was aware that many ordinary church members were still ‘prevented from joining political parties’, Christian teachers often fearing to be ‘put on a black list by the missionary managers or their Education Officers’.

It was now that Reginald Maudling succeeded Iain Macleod as Colonial Secretary. Macleod’s two years had undoubtedly exposed him to extraordinary strain and his touch had been less certain in Northern Rhodesia’s crisis than in the less complicated Nyasaland situation. Kenneth Kaunda, however, spoke very warmly of him. ‘Mr Macleod’s departure from the Colonial Office is a matter of deep regret to me because he was obviously a very progressive Colonial Secretary. But as one who counts him as friend, I am happy at his promotion and, who knows, the first African Prime Minister of Zambia might have to be welcomed into the Commonwealth by British Prime Minister Macleod. Mr. Macleod’s promotion could mean he was probably consulted about his successor. We welcome Mr. Maudling to his new post. It is a difficult one. But he is obviously a modern Tory M.P. and realises only too well that “Men shall not live by bread alone.”’

Sir Roy Welensky was meanwhile renewing pressure for the Federal Review Conference to be reconvened, and at home his ‘Build a Nation’ campaign was appealing for inter-racial coexistence in goodwill. But Mainza Chona decried the ‘Build a Nation’ campaign as specious. People of all races, he said ‘are tired of their impossible and dangerous resistance to the advent of the inevitable’, and Kenneth Kaunda claimed that ‘reliable sources’ confirmed a secret alliance between the U.F.P. and Colin Cunningham’s fanatical ‘F.F.’ Meanwhile Roberts was still refusing to join all-party consultations under the chairmanship of Hone though it was rumoured that Welensky was urging him to change his mind, now that it had been announced that Maudling would soon visit the Protectorate.

A Grim Peep into the North had now been released by UNIP’s International and Publicity Bureau and was eventually to be answered, in January 1962, by the Government’s Account of the Disturbances in Northern Rhodesia, July to October, 1961. UNIP had rejected the Government report in advance on the ground that ‘the accused would be their own judges.’ Kaunda in his introduction to A Grim Peep, stated that the evidence which he had gathered in person on his trip to the two worst troubled provinces had convinced him that the ‘so-called security forces’ had been guilty of ‘murder, arson, plunder and savage atrocities. . . .’ ‘The charge I make,’ he wrote, ‘is a serious one but it is true. . . .’ ‘I am positive that the Central Government does not possess full facts. . . . much less His Excellency himself.’ The sum of the evidence showed that ‘whole villages have been razed to the ground, foodstuffs including goats, sheep and fowls have been taken away, to say nothing of clothed, pots, pans and other utensils.’ ‘What they could not take away they destroyed.’ The Chiefs, Kenneth affirmed had received him and his colleagues on their tour ‘with open hands [s/c]’, and he paid a special tribute to the Bemba Paramount Chief, Chitimukulu, ‘my beloved natural ruler’. The campaign against ifitupa had been successful. In consequence, ‘prisons are so full now that. . . there are as many as three prisoners to a blanket.’

The immediate effect of the publication of A Grim Peep was that the Government set to work compiling its own account of ‘Cha-cha-cha’. Of the two documents, Mulford has said that the Government’s Account of
Disturbances, although ‘less flamboyant and containing fewer extreme exaggerations, was no less biased than UNIP’s’. Indeed it appeared to have been consciously manipulated, according to a letter to the Administrative Secretary from the officer who prepared it. ‘I have endeavoured to be frank enough to resist charges of white-washing and yet restrained enough to avoid making unnecessary self-inflicted wounds. I hope I have not offended the security forces by gratuitous criticism and at the same time to have disarmed those who will charge us with evasion. ... I have been mindful of the necessity of avoiding any reference to the central leadership of UNIP, which might present new ammunition to the opposition in Legislative Council, and might embarrass us in impending constitutional negotiations.’

On 1 November, Governor Hone had announced that law and order had been restored. The evidence suggests that this chance to draw breath again came, to a great extent, because Kenneth Kaunda, who had not swerved from the necessity of non-violence, had survived a crisis marked by extravagant violence upon persons and property in villages built of forest poles and roofed with grass. When Mulford writes that ‘without tarnishing his image as a militant nationalist leader’ Kaunda had sought to ease the party towards ‘constitutional negotiations and to encourage the policy of multiracialism’, we are given the image of a delicate manoeuverer, a politician astutely maintaining his own position. Yet the testimony of his close colleagues is that he stayed as their leader because, at one and the same time, he insisted on principles without which he foresaw chaos, while being quick to listen and open to the thoughts and concerns not only of his associates but also of people like Iain Macleod and Evelyn Hone who were nominally in the opposing camp. One might expect to find a disciple of non-violence in a party of ‘moderates’, but what distinguished the struggle in Northern Rhodesia was that its most revolutionary nationalists and those most bitter against the pervasive crudities and insults of ‘the colour bar’ acclaimed Kenneth as their spokesman. There were undoubtedly rumblings of discontent as well as personal jealousies within UNIP, but the Party had remained loyal to the man who, in Lewis Changufu’s words, kept their minds ‘fixed on the struggle for freedom’ and whose ‘determination and clear thinking’ gave so much encouragement to them. The man who ‘kept them on their toes’ was the same man who pointed constantly to a new society to be attained without hatred or bloodshed.

The memorandum which Kenneth Kaunda submitted to the new Colonial Secretary called for a clear African majority in the Legislature, affirmed the failure of the Lancaster House Conference, declared that the African people would not ‘swallow’ an imposed settlement, and pressed for a legislative majority representing the electoral majority. A few days later, on 12 December, Kaunda said that UNIP was declaring ‘political war’ on the draining from the country of vast sums of money in the form of B.S.A. Company royalties. There was information in his possession which would not be released yet to the effect that the Company was politically linked with what was going on in Katanga as well as in Angola, Mozambique and South Africa. This fresh attack on the British South Africa Company was being joined by well-informed critics of white supremacy abroad. Fenner Brockway called the Company ‘the evil genius of Rhodesia’ and quoted Welensky’s strictures, made thirteen years earlier in Leg. Co., upon “agreements, if you can call them that... negotiated in the early part of the nineties... “The Company knew what it was after” Welensky had said, “but I certainly question whether any African chief... knew that he was disposing of... mineral rights.” ’ The Company, Brockway pointed out, was so
wealthy that ‘even in a lean year it is able to pay a dividend of 30%....’ ‘Until 1964 it is to have half the proceeds of land disposed of by the Government of NW Rhodesia.’ Moreover ‘it owns 99% of the shares of the Rhodesia Railway Trust.’ Obviously ‘the African people of Northern Rhodesia, existing in poverty, are not likely to allow one alien company to net millions of pounds a year from royalties on their natural resources.’ Brockway then showed what in fact this ‘netting’ represented. ‘If one takes an average year, between boom and slump, the mineral royalties . . . amounted to £8,857,691, while the 39,000 African miners were paid £7,341,374 in wages.’ That figure gave an average annual wage for these miners of about £190. Not surprisingly, as the Northern News had stated ‘right from the beginning of Federation, the BSA Company and the big mining companies have been paying a considerable subsidy to the United Federal Party.’ Welensky, who as a settlers’ leader in the nineteen- forties had wanted the wealth of the Company for his compatriots, had come to realise a common interest between his U.F.P. and the B.S.A. in face of ‘the wind of change’ in Central Africa.

As the spotlight turned upon the B.S.A. Company’s role and UNIP drew closer to the African Trade Union movement, it was proving very difficult to avoid racial polarisation. Kenneth Kaunda had expressed his deep concern to Harold Macmillan, in the critical period in July, over the fact that the Federal call-up could apply to provincial officers. ‘The arming of our white people . . . against the British Protected black people’ posed a grave enough danger of breeding race hatred, but the conscription of men sent from Britain as colonial officers meant that they were ‘compelled to owe their first allegiance to the Federal Government. . . and not to the Imperial Government. . . .’ ‘Therefore’ he said ‘your Government can no longer protect my black people nor the thousands of white people and Asians who object to being ruled from Salisbury.’

There was, moreover, a regular flow to UNIP headquarters of reports of ‘brutalities’ done by police and other officials, listing the names of persons tortured and specifying the form of torture inflicted, which allegedly included locking in an ice-chamber, use of hot irons, assault of private parts, and forcing people to spend a night on a wet floor. The prospect of a further extension of military action throughout the territory was seen as a grave threat to any attempts to restore confidence and peace. Mainza Chona ended one statement on ‘Police Brutalities’ by saying: ‘If this is what Christianity and civilisation are, I tell every European civiliser to pack up and go without leaving a single Bible behind. Colonialism stinks and is a sinful evil.’

In retrospect, Kaunda has spoken of police excesses as ‘a scar that has been very difficult to clear’. Among his personal experiences, he has told of an occasion, in the ‘Cha-cha-cha’ period, when after he had been working late in his Lusaka office, he was about to set off for the Copperbelt with Sikalumbi. As they sent out for fish and chips to eat on the way, Sikalumbi was called by the police. ‘Where is Kaunda going?’ they asked. Kenneth himself answered that they had ‘no business’ to ask this question. ‘You’ll soon learn,’ Kenneth replied, ‘that what I’m doing isn’t mischievous.’ At this, the officer began to search him roughly, and Kaunda said, ‘Be careful. You might have to pay for this one day.’ They had not gone far when they were stopped by another group of police who ‘manhandled’ the driver. ‘Who are you?’ an officer shouted at Kaunda, ‘You’re a trouble-maker.’ ‘I may be today,’ Kenneth retorted, ‘but I won’t be tomorrow.’ He was certain that his Party was ‘on the winning side’ at that time, but keenly aware that ‘the image of the police was so bad that it would be very hard to reconcile the people to them’. Again, in his northern tour in November, he
found the police and District Messengers constantly on his trail. This was the
time when, as he recalled, he ‘received so many blessings from the Chiefs, a
total of 12 deportation orders’. We have cited sufficient extracts from UNIP’s
documents to confirm the forceful utterance used by many of its publicists. Among the many communications emanating from UNIP headquarters in the latter part of 1961, the following specially reveal both the range of international concerns pressing upon the Party and the pungency of its message. For instance, Kapwepwe rebuked the leaders of ‘the Pan-Africanist Congress outside South Africa’ for selling the principles of the movements’ martyrs. ‘I think if to the alteration of Macleod’s orginal 15-15-15 ‘parity’ proposals, which, he said, must have been made on the recommendation of ‘senior advisers in Northern Rhodesia’. Though it had ‘been said in Sir Evelyn Hone’s favour that he did not understand his own proposals’, he had taken responsibility for them by signing them. This statement ended with reference to the trial in Lusaka recently of a white man who had assaulted the American Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, G. Mennon Williams. In this case, the magistrate, ruling out a political motive, had handed down a fine of £50. ‘Do you think,’ asked Kaunda, ‘that the magistrate would have fined a UNIP man £50 for an offence of this type?’ ‘No ... he would have handed out 2 years hard labour and 12 strokes of the cane’ for a “criminal political assault”. ‘Is this what is meant by British Justice? Are these the laws our students are being taught in universities overseas?’ Above all, however, it was the need for a forward look to galvanize creative energies and build unity on a basis sounder than the sharing of a common enemy that was uppermost in Kenneth Kaunda’s mind at this time. Therefore, a week before Christmas, he issued a confidential circular to the Party’s Central Committee. ‘Very often,’ he began, ‘we have stressed to the British Government that they could not decide on anything pertaining to our country in isolation from what is taking place elsewhere on the Continent.’ It was no less essential for his people to be aware of what he called ‘the international financiers’. The Congo tragedy brought out in sharp relief the mercilessness of their power. Patrice Lumumba, ‘never a communist’, had appealed to Russia before he had ‘consolidated his forces’. Thus ‘Tshombe’, he wrote, ‘was used only as a tool in this sad tragic event’ of Lumumba’s death. This international power block had also effected President Kennedy’s very recent swift volte face from his declared support for United Nations action in the Congo. South Africa, Portugal and Welensky were in alliance with this bloc. But, he went on, ‘this paper is not designed to scare us into submission to the forces of oppression....’ ‘[They] are powerful and it would be tragic to ignore them. . . . [But] it cannot be overemphasised that the answer lies in effective organisation. This means a careful study of our cultural, social, economic and political problems at all levels. . . . There is a real need to come down to the people. . . . One other factor ... is Mangaliso [Sobukwe] could be allowed by these cruel Boers to peep outside his jail... he would, I am sure, die of shock.’ Nearer home, the activities of Colin Cunningham roused the fury of Mukuka Nkoloso who wrote to the press accusing him of ‘growing bigger than his political boots’ by propagating the ‘venomous and acrid poison of racialism’ through his Rhodesian Republican Party, ‘a gang of ferocious mercenaries’. In December, Sikota Wina issued a statement welcoming the retirement of Martin Wray, the Chief Secretary, whom he accused of ‘intemperate and unwarranted hysterics’ at the time of the revelation, through UNIP, of the mathematical ‘hidden meaning of the Macleod
June Plan’. Wina then stated that Sir Evelyn Hone was ‘not a good Governor but . . . probably the best Northern Rhodesia has had for a long time . . . [and] would have been much better’ but for ‘the ill-intended advices [s/c] of his Chief Secretary’. At the same time, just before the New Year, Chona wrote to the United Nations in New York condemning Welensky’s demand for an investigation of U.N. conduct in Katanga as ‘an endeavour to focus world attention away’ from the Federation’s plan to use secessionist Katanga as ‘a buffer against the Independent African states’. Welensky had expressed his hope, in 1960, that ‘this vast and rich part of the Belgian Congo . . . could throw off its old ties and join the Federation’. Since then, Chona alleged, there had been an ‘office to recruit mercenaries’ for Katanga opened in Lusaka. Katangan planes had been given use of Northern Rhodesian aerodromes ‘without hindrance’. This was creating a grave threat to peace in Africa and beyond and so Kaunda, on behalf of ‘the major political movement in Rhodesia’ was ‘prepared to appear before the UNO in person’.

Kenneth Kaunda was meanwhile making prolific use of his pen, despite his ceaseless travel in the country and abroad. Party organisation was worrying him in the wake of the northern disturbances and, in a circular calling for vigorous discipline and systematic communication within UNIP, he warned that he was ‘going to check on every branch’ week by week. By press statements in late September and October, he warned strongly against the military activities of the U.F.P. ‘They must be told,’ he said, ‘that we would lack neither courage nor resources of dangerous weapons.’ ‘We could get anything here tomorrow,’ if the building of ‘U.F.P. resistance armies’ went ‘too far’. A lengthy statement was devoted

that the purchasing of landrovers for divisional leaders has made a good number of them reluctant to walk, run or cycle.’ He proposed therefore a dividing of the present divisions into regions which, he believed, would ‘help to build a new spirit among our people and . . . keep the government of an independent Zambia intact.’

New Year 1962 began with a cautionary note from Maudling about demands for independence, and a bitter broadside from Welensky against the past year’s pattern of ‘liberation for colonial peoples’ whereby, he claimed, ‘in Africa, fresh areas of chaos and depression were opened up.’ Harry Nkumbula then came out of jail to a Congress cocktail party, and at once resumed the Congress Presidency, which had been held by Mungoni Liso since the death of Katilungu in a road accident in November. Just as UNIP threatened to resume its ‘Master Plan’ there was a ‘leak’ from London to the effect that Handling’s revision of Macleod’s June 1961 plan would favour African candidates. The Colonial Secretary, it was said, was ‘eager to dispose of the Northern Rhodesia question’. Kaunda’s concern over Handling’s delay led him to warn that he might have to move a ‘mass mine strike’ from the fifth to the third stage of his ‘Plan’. He was at once countered by John Chisata’s declaration that the A.M.W.U. ‘could not stand a strike’. Sikota Wina however took the threat further by talking of ‘country-wide strikes to bring to a complete standstill every activity’. The welter of prejudice and passion was further agitated by more news of mercenaries, this time a group of 35, passing through Ndola on their way to help Tshombe and by U Thant’s specific reference, which Welensky did not deny, to ‘the activities of a Dornier aircraft based at Ndola and piloted by one Mr Wickstead’. As January drew to a close, Kaunda said he had an authoritative report of a meeting between Tshombe and Welensky in the Queen’s House, Kitwe. Meanwhile in Southern Rhodesia the National
Democratic Party had been banned in December, and the former Chief Justice, Sir Robert Tredgold, had warned that, by extinguishing ‘the only political organisation that could claim a wide measure of African support,’ Whitehead had moved ‘towards the one-party system of government, which is totalitarian’. The press now reported the possibility of a split in the British cabinet with Maudling and Macleod lined up against a group led by Lord Home who held that it was ‘vital not to antagonise Sir Roy’. But telegrams were piling up on Kenneth’s desk demanding action on the ‘Master Plan’ and Justin Chimba feared that they indicated tension so high that ‘an eruption of some sort’ might happen without instructions from the Party President. Kaunda’s reaction was to reiterate that it might be necessary to paralyse the mines and that, in preparation for such a possibility, people should not spend money on drink and on clothing, for ‘who knows how long a strike will last?’ Then, as at previous moments of high tension, he went abroad, this time to Ethiopia. ‘While I am out of the country, nothing must happen,’ he ordered. ‘But if I don’t take the strike action if the Constitution does not come out right, I must be prepared to be overthrown and let other leaders take my place.’ Meanwhile, he urged, people should await word of changes in the Constitution and ‘drink milk instead of beer’.

The correspondence columns of the press were increasingly filled with letters for and against UNIP. One African correspondent blamed Kaunda because ‘unlike the Moffats, he has taught us disrespect for chiefs and how to hate one another [and] also frightened away capital’. Meanwhile, some members of UNIP were talking of the men hanged ‘for the alleged murder of a European woman’ as ‘freedom fighters’. Once again, therefore, Kenneth made a public apology, on UNIP’s behalf, for this statement, repeating his ‘shock’ at the murder and his condemnation of it. ‘On the other hand,’ he said, ‘the act of the four men who had to find an outlet for their pent-up nationalism can be understood.’ He was continuing his programme of meetings with ‘non-Africans’, at which the death of Mrs. Burton was constantly raised. Robert Burton was again involved in the controversy and asked for further reassurance from Kaunda. ‘I had always held the view,’ he wrote, ‘that the incident of 8th May, 1960, was one of vandalism, not one of political violence laid at the door of any party.’ ‘It seems I was wrong.’ A considerable number of Europeans still echoed the sentiments of one letter to the Northern News which said that ‘the African has subscribed literally nothing to the development of his country except to shout “Kwacha”’. ‘Roy Welensky meanwhile rejected any ‘compromise with PanAfricanism’ whereby ‘a man’s race is to count, not his ability’, as news was recived that the Pan-African Movement of East and Central Africa was to discuss positive aid to the recently formed Zimbabwe African People’s Union and to UNIP. At PAFMECA’s meeting at Addis Ababa in February 1962, Kenneth Kaunda was elected President, and word came from Addis that he had demonstrated to other leaders that ‘the spearhead of African liberation had now reached’ his own country. The U.F.P. line was therefore more and more to build up the reputation of ‘moderate Africans’. Godwin Mbikusita’s remark that, in the eyes of the Chiefs, UNIP and ‘other racialist parties were “youth clubs” ’ to which it was unbelievable that Britain should pay attention, made him an ideal model of such ‘moderation’.

Cha-cha-cha, as a popular ‘dance’ towards independence, had not ended with the Governor’s statement that the situation in the north had been brought under control. The drums were still throbbing though the ecstasy had slackened, and for months to come the land was to be filled with agitation. Just
after 16,301 out of 16,601 A.M.W.U men had voted in favour of a strike, fear mounted that Britain was planning to encourage the secession of Barotseland. Meanwhile Cunningham’s Rhodesian Republican Party and the Dominion Party were considering a merger to force Welensky’s resignation, for being too ‘moderate’, which may have pushed Welensky into making his famous utterance about being ‘prepared to fight... to go the whole hog if necessary’. Immediately UNIP’s Chona and Wina retorted that, if Welensky were to use force, it would be ‘a signal for red war’. On the same day, news came that the Revd. Michael Scott’s World Peace Brigade was plannin