



## **International academic Workshop**

**“Germany’s West Africa policy: new approaches, perceptions and expectations from the region”**

Dakar (Senegal), Hotel Fleur de Lys Plateau, February 11<sup>th</sup> - February 13<sup>th</sup> 2020

gefördert durch



# Program

## February 11<sup>th</sup> 2020

11:00-16:00 *Visit to Gorée Island and Memorial Site*

19:00-21:00 *Welcome Dinner*

## February 12<sup>th</sup> 2020

09:30-10:00 *Opening remarks*

Prof. Dr. Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven, *Institute for Theology and Peace*

Prof. Dr. Michael Staack, *Helmut-Schmidt-University*

Prof. Dr. Djénéba Traoré, *West Africa Institute*

Prof. Dr. Oumar Ndongo, *Center for Diplomatic and Strategic Studies*

10:00-12:00 **Panel 1: “Empowerment of Women: Education, Healthcare, Jobs”**

Adelaide Ekua Otoo Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre

Alex Tendeng *Caritas St. Louis*

Lillian Kuutiero, *Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre* (Commentary)

Prof. Dr. Djénéba Traoré, *West Africa Institute* (Chair)

12:00-14:00 *Lunch break*

14:00-16:30 **Panel 2: “Peace Process in Mali – Prospects for Peace and Stability?”**

Prof. Dr. Omorou Touré, *University of Law and Political Sciences of Bamako*

Rémy Diousse, *Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation* (Commentary)

Sonja Nietz, *Helmut-Schmidt-University* (Chair)

16:30-17:00 *Coffee / Tea break*

18:00-21:00 *Reception hosted by Ambassador Stephan Röken at the residence of the German Embassy*

## February 13<sup>th</sup> 2020

9:30-11:30 **Panel 3: “Organizing Regional Cooperation: ECOWAS and Sahel G5 – Interlocking or Interblocking?”**

Prof. Dr. Oumar Ndongo, *Center for Diplomatic and Strategic Studies*

Dr. Claire Demesmay, *German Council on Foreign Relations*

Prof. Dr. Michael Staack, *Helmut-Schmidt-University* (Chair)

11:30-13:00 **Lunch break**

13:00-15:00 **Panel 4: “On the right track? Compact with Africa and Economic Partnership Agreements”**

Thomas Mättig, *Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation*

Dr. Habib Yaya Habbah, *ECOWAS Commission*

Prof. Dr. Omorou Touré, *University of Law and Political Sciences of Bamako*  
(Commentary)

Prof. Dr. Mouhamedoune Fall, *Gaston Berger University* (Chair)

15:00-15:15 **Coffee / Tea break**

15:15-16:00 **Preliminary Results: Roundtable Discussion**

Lillian Mwintome Kuutiero, *Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre*

Prof. Dr. Oumar Ndongo, *Center for Diplomatic and Strategic Studies*

Prof. Dr. Michael Staack, *Helmut-Schmidt-University*

Prof. Dr. Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven, *Institute for Theology and Peace*

Prof. Dr. Djénéba Traoré, *West Africa Institute* (Chair)

17:00-18:30 **Dialogue: “Next generation: Expectations for Germany / EU by young social scientists from Cheikh Anta Diop University of Dakar”**

... in dialogue with the German ambassador to Senegal, Stephan Röken

Chair: Prof. Dr. Djénéba Traoré, *West Africa Institute*, and Prof. Dr. Michael Staack, *Helmut-Schmidt-University*

19:00-21:00 **Dinner**

## **Participants List\***

Agboton, Christiane Johnson Dr., *Center for Higher Defense Studies and Security*

Bappah, Habib Yaya Dr., *ECOWAS Commission*

Demesmay, Claire Dr., *German Council on Foreign Relations*

Diallo, Babacar Dr., *Center for Diplomatic and Strategic Studies*

Dioussé, Rémy, *Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, Peace and Security Centre of Competence Sub-Saharan Africa*

Diouf, Ndooffene Coumba, *Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa*

Fall, Mouhamedoune Prof. Dr., *Gaston Berger University*

Goldberg, Philipp, *Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, Peace and Security Centre of Competence Sub-Saharan Africa*

Justenhoven, Heinz-Gerhard Prof. Dr., *Institute for Theology and Peace*

Kuutiero Mwintome, Lillian, *Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre*

Mättig, Thomas, *Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation*

Ndongo, Oumar Prof. Dr., *Center for Diplomatic and Strategic Studies*

Nietz, Sonja, *Helmut-Schmidt-University*

Otoo Ekua Mrenfoa, Adelaide, *Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre*

Röken, Stephan (Ambassador), *German Embassy*

Samake, Thérèse Dr., *Catholic University of West Africa*

Schrage, Marco Dr., *Institute for Theology and Peace*

Staack, Michael Prof. Dr., *Helmut-Schmidt-University*

Tendeng, Alex, *Caritas Diocesan of Saint-Louis*

Touré, Omorou Prof. Dr., *University of Law and Political Sciences of Bamako*

Traoré, Djénéba Prof. Dr., *West Africa Institute*

*\*Names are listed in alphabetical order.*

## Recommendations

1. The establishment of a functioning state is considered as the most important prerequisite for stability and development in West Africa. A state that can fulfil its central functions is recognized by its citizens as legitimate. By contrast, state failure is not only a cause of structural destabilization of the states concerned, but also enriches the possibilities for terrorist and criminal networks to establish and expand their activities. Strengthening statehood is therefore a key strategy for achieving stability in the region. Apart from Mali, Burkina Faso, in particular, seems less and less able to fulfil central state functions.
2. The EU and Germany should enhance their engagement in terms of economic and technical development and the empowerment of women and girls. Greater involvement of men is needed to raise awareness and coherence of gender issues in local communities and to initiate far-reaching social change within society. Necessary changes are a long-term process that should be pursued in a conflict-sensitive manner. Economic development, poverty reduction, and empowerment of women and girls have to go hand in hand. Germany can contribute to this through targeted development cooperation and by promoting dialogue processes within African society.
3. Migration towards Europe is not a solution for better development in West Africa. Nor is sealing off Europe a solution in the EU. In its own demographic and labour market related interest, Germany should provide opportunities for legal immigration through educational cooperation and qualified access to certain groups such as in the areas of nursing and health care.
4. For almost five decades, ECOWAS has been an efficient regional organization for all of West Africa. While founded on the primary goal of economic integration, however, it very quickly expanded its activities to include security policy and foreign policy coordination. Nevertheless, ECOWAS does not yet have the military capabilities to be able to guarantee peace in West Africa without international support. Conflicts of interest between anglo- and francophone member states represent latent obstacles, however, there are possibilities for these to be overcome by a balancing and reconciliation of interests. The EU and Germany should therefore promote the strengthening of ECOWAS' capacity to act.
5. Neither capacity-building measures nor anti-terrorism missions have so far led to significant successes in the region. Instead of expanding stability, the G5 troops had to accept further destabilization and a massive loss of control, especially in the border regions of Burkina, Mali, and Niger. Since the force is unable to maintain their own safety, it has become a preferred target for terrorist attacks. As became clear at the summit meeting between French President Macron and the heads of state of the five G5 countries in January 2020 in Pau, France, the G5 cooperation format is in a serious crisis. Against this background, it should be examined whether the joint G5 force has not become counterproductive. There is an alternative to the G5 force via the strengthening of the military capacity of ECOWAS.
6. The Economic Partnership Agreements and the Compact with Africa are to be viewed skeptically. Despite some improvements, these economic agreements consolidate asymmetrical trade relations in favour of the EU and hinder agriculture and industrialization development in West Africa. Hence, there is a serious need for an amendment of the initiatives to create better development options for the region, the effects of which would also indirectly benefit the EU.
7. A participation of the Bundeswehr in the French-combat operations and the joint G5 force is not promising. Instead, Germany should expand its involvement within the EUTM mission – if it is reformed in agreement with the Malian government.
8. A more cooperative and coherent approach, especially in cooperation between regional and external actors, is highly recommended in terms of peace and security policy. Mutual expectations must be discussed and taken into account to a greater extent. However, measures should follow the principle '(West) African solutions to (West) African problems'.

# Workshop Report 2020

## Abstract

This second international workshop on “*Germany’s West Africa policy: new approaches, perceptions and expectations from the region*”, was held from February 11<sup>th</sup> until February 13<sup>th</sup> 2020 in Dakar, Senegal. In contrast to the first workshop in Berlin (2018), which particularly dealt with the European and German perspectives on the security situation in West Africa, this year’s workshop in Dakar naturally placed special emphasis on West African perspectives and challenges with regard to security, human, and economic conflicts and an in-depth analysis of the efforts that have been made to address them, and the challenges that remain. At the same time, this project’s guiding research question pertains to the role and limits of Germany’s West Africa policy with regard to a closer consideration of expectations from the region in order to address the most delicate conflicts.

Coordination of the workshop on the German side was carried out by the *Helmut-Schmidt-University* (Prof. Dr. Michael Staack) and the *Institute for Theology and Peace* (Prof. Dr. Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven), both situated in Hamburg, Germany. The majority of leading scholars, political analysts and practitioners came from West Africa, particularly from Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Cabo Verde, and Senegal. A few participants came from Europe, namely from Germany and France. Cooperation partners from within the region are the *West Africa Institute* (Prof. Dr. Djénéba Traoré) in Praia, Cabo Verde, and the *Centre d’Etudes Diplomatiques et Stratégiques* (Prof. Dr. Oumar Ndongo) in Dakar, Senegal.

## **Problem Statement / Research Question**

Germany’s interest in West Africa has significantly increased since 2013 and has led to political upgrading of the region. This is not only due to the Bundeswehr missions in Mali, which commenced in 2013 and are conducted within the EU and UN frameworks, but also due to the increase in migration flows from Africa towards Europe. Although the German Federal Government has intensified its developing policy, migration policy, and its foreign and security policy as well as its activities in the region and has underpinned them programmatically by means of several strategy papers, a number of conflicting goals can be identified. These include, among others, the inadequate inclusion of regional and local perceptions and approaches as well as insufficient coordination with partners within the region.

Against this background, the *research question* to be addressed is: “To what extent do German and African expectations concerning the development of the West African region coincide, to what extent and at which aspects do they diverge, and what conclusions can be drawn from this in order to improve cooperation for development and security in the future?”

## **General Findings**

The major results of the workshop include:

1. Unanimity with regard to the fragile security situation in West Africa and the broader Sahel region.
2. A common awareness relating to the overall significance of gender-based inequalities and the serious limitations to tackle these issues, especially in rural areas.

3. Joint consensus that certain progress has been made with regard to bilateral and multilateral security frameworks taking several challenges into account, including economic underdevelopment, terrorism and organized crime. At the same time, however, all workshop participants agreed that there is still a lot that needs to be done, in particular with regard to the African Peace and Security Architecture and ECOWAS as well as with respect to cooperative security between member states and the new ad-hoc joint forces (e.g. joint Sahel G5 force).

4. Robust discussions have highlighted the existence of perception gaps on the African and the European sides pertaining to the risk of possible miscalculations, misperceptions, let alone unintended conflict escalation in the Sahel and, thus, to the necessity to adjust to the latter accordingly as well.

5. A vast approval to the need of ongoing and enhanced (institutionalized) efforts of multilateral exchanges of academic, political, and other local and external experts. There was general agreement that the workshop in Dakar was important to keep the topics discussed in the spotlight and to enhance relationships of trust and knowledge exchange between all participants.

### **Panel 1: “Empowerment of Women: Education, Healthcare, Jobs”**

**Key questions:** *How can educational opportunities, healthcare provision and economic integration of women be enhanced? What are the most pressing and expedient priorities in these areas? Are German policies already meeting these requirements?*

Adelaide Ekua M. Otoo (Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre)

In the first speech of the first panel, Adelaide Otoo made clear that both SDG Goal 5 and the AU’s Agenda 2063 aim to promote full gender equality in all spheres of life through the empowerment of women and girls. Therefore, she stated that an integrated approach is highly needed which encompasses simultaneous promotion of education, health, and socio-economic development. Otoo continued to elaborate on this in more detail, noting that while primary education enrolment in Africa made steady progress since 1999 and school enrolment rates more than doubled between 1990 and 2012, gender gaps in educational attainment have continued to widen. Moreover, she emphasised that while an educated household is more likely to achieve the maximum return from agricultural activity and thus increase the food security potential of households, however, education does not guarantee empowerment of all women. There are several reasons for this, including gender-specific norms that are often reflected in most women’s careers in the areas of food and nutrition, cosmetics and sewing. Women are also most effected by socio-cultural and structural challenges, among others, high maternal and child mortality, early and forced marriage, teenage pregnancy, and lack of access to health infrastructure.

Based on these considerations, Otoo came to *three specific conclusions* as well as *three recommendations* for change: First, enhanced education and sensitization is needed for both women and men. Second, more attention should be paid to address infrastructure and personnel deficits, including the expansion of training for professionals and health workers. Third, the promotion of public-private partnerships is highly recommended. In addition, she explicitly welcomed Germany’s growing interest in the West African region. As just two positive examples, Germany supports pandemic prevention and rural development. Yet, the most important steps in order to improve the fragile security situation in West Africa involve enhanced support for the financial inclusion of women, the strengthening of the role of worker-owned cooperative unions and greater promotion of education and gender policies at workplaces.

Alex Tendeng (Caritas St. Louis)

Alex Tendeng gave a detailed overview of the current state of gender inequality with a special focus on the situation of many women and girls in Senegal. To highlight just a few examples, Tendeng stressed that women are often excluded from leading positions in the economy and political decision-making bodies. In addition, early marriage and polygamy are not only a major obstacle to economic participation, but above all a source of suffering for women, as some husbands exploit rivalries between their wives. Women and girls are also the most vulnerable in terms of food insecurity as they generally have less control over the means of production – land, materials, and water – and less access to financial resources than men. As a more recent trend, he added that gender-based violence against women and girls – physical, sexual, psychological, and economical abuse – is on the rise. While state authorities have ratified and implemented international instruments for the protection of human rights in addition to the legal arsenal that is continuously built up, increased efforts are still needed, according to Tendeng.

Following from this, he underscored his impression that sustainable development and, more particularly, poverty reduction in Senegal and other countries cannot be achieved without the elimination of gender inequalities. In this vein, he further highlighted that it is particularly important to recognize the primary responsibility of local people for development and change, but their capacity to do so needs to be strengthened. Therefore, external actors should follow four main priorities. This includes: (1) building projects around complementary pillars so that local people can (re)build the conditions for their own autonomy; (2) initiating innovations that increase the market share of local products; (3) measuring the impact of actions to draw useful lessons beyond specific projects; (4) continuing to develop strategies for scale change to ensure that successful initiatives do not remain marginal.

## **Panel 2: “Peace Process in Mali – Prospects for Peace and Stability?”**

**Key questions:** *Why is the Malian peace process not progressing? What general measures can be taken in order to support the peace process? Can Germany contribute to an improved development of Mali?*

Prof. Dr. Omorou Touré (University of Law and Political Sciences of Bamako)

This talk was divided into three major parts: the role of local ownership, neglected issues within the Malian peace process and, last but not least, the current status quo of Germany’s engagement in Mali. First, Prof. Touré emphasized, as did the previous speaker, the need to strengthen local ownership as one key element of peacebuilding in West Africa. By ownership, he understood that “local actors have a say in formulating the outcomes. This involves several different actors, requires the mobilization of external funds and poses the problem of the expectations of the populations”. Weak ownership in Mali mainly results from the country’s high dependency on external resources and the population’s lack of human, institutional, material and financial resources. At present, discussions on the future of Mali are dominated almost exclusively by a small political elite. Civil society demands and critical voices of the (unarmed) majority are not sufficiently recognized – this runs counter to genuine local ownership. Furthermore, Prof. Touré stressed that due to the deteriorating security situation in Mali, various relevant issues should be (re)considered. For example, he rejected the basic assumption held by African political leaders and the international community that the borders arbitrarily drawn during the struggle for Africa should continue to be generally respected. Other models such as the Belgian Federation, the Swiss Confederation or increased decentralization measures should be openly discussed. Moreover, there is a need for enhanced cooperation



with neighboring Algeria to better resolve Tuareg grievances in Mali. Likewise, more attention should be paid to traditional conflict resolution mechanisms in order to improve access of the local population to the rule of law. In this context, Prof. Touré further emphasized that Germany is visible with regard to the reform of the security sector and its support of civil society organizations, which is highly esteemed within Malian society. Several fractions continue to adhere to the principles of the 2015-peace agreement and call on the international community and Germany for further support, he added. Apart from Germany's strong commitment to enhance security institutions, Touré recommended that supporting consensus building and capacity building within civil society and promoting understanding of the root causes of challenges in Mali at the international level need similar attention.

Rémy Dioussé (Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation)

On the basis of a study by the FES-Mali, titled '*The Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali as a result of the Algiers Process*', Rémy Dioussé attempts to explain the extremely complex conflict dynamic in Mali and to name the most important factors leading the peace process into a dead end. Dioussé dwelled upon *three major points*: (1) A fragile socio-political environment characterized by a lack of leadership and political will on the part of those in power. (2) Unsatisfactory and non-inclusive security arrangements which are essentially based on an "all security approach". (3) A certain form of security supply by the international community and France – "as if the solution were external rather than local". This said, he argued that for tackling current challenges in Mali, more attention must be paid at least to *four measures*: Firstly, the adoption of measures that promote political, institutional, and economic reforms in order to strengthen a functioning state. Secondly, the identification of new approaches to build coalitions for progressive change through civil society empowerment, the private sector, and the media. Thirdly, an inclusive dialogue between local communities and political actors. Fourth, creating new visions for the future of Mali. At the end of his speech, Dioussé put forward several future recommendations with regard to the role played by Germany. While the country is an increasingly important actor in West Africa, however, a closer look reveals that its engagement is mainly focused on capacity building within the security and military sector. In this vein, Dioussé expressed his doubts that such an approach is likely to succeed desired goals. Among others, he suggested that Germany can make a stronger contribution to the peace process in Mali by enhanced support of the economic development through investment in industrial, infrastructural, and technological development projects; by supporting the education and training sector; by investing in the promotion of an inclusive political dialogue, including state actors, civil society organizations and armed actors; and by contributing to the restoration of the rule of law throughout the country.

**Panel 3: "Organizing Regional Cooperation: ECOWAS and Sahel G5 –Interlocking or Interblocking?"**

**Key questions:** *How has the Sahel G5 capacity-building process developed so far? Did the strong focus by Germany, France and the European Union on this institution actually prove effective in practice? How could the ECOWAS be successfully strengthened alongside Sahel G5?*

Prof. Dr. Oumar Ndong (Centre d'Etudes Diplomatiques et Stratégiques)

As the first panelist of the third panel, Prof. Dr. Oumar Ndong started off with a definition of the central terms to be discussed within the panel. He defined 'interlocking' as "firmly joined together, especially by

one part fitting into another. Pieces adjusting harmoniously – in French called ‘un enclenchement’”. In contrast to this, ‘interlocking’ is present “when in a system two processes or tasks cannot progress because they are not synchronized. A deadlock” – in French described as ‘une impasse’”. He then went on to describe the relationship and partially overlapping memberships of countries within ECOWAS, the Community of Sahel-Saharan States, and the Sahel G5 Organization. Prof. Ndongu concluded his observations by stating that within West Africa, responsibilities and competence are vague at different levels and involve several actors. Furthermore, he went on to stress that significant changes are needed beyond the region. In this context, he referred to the most recent summit in the French city of Pau in January 2020, where French President Emmanuel Macron hosted his G5 Sahel counterparts from Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad to discuss some of the practices and outcomes of the joint G5 force in the fight against armed groups and the future of French military presence in the West African region. According to Prof. Ndongu, *four critical measures* came out quite clearly: (1) the actions of all military forces must be adequately coordinated; (2) the exchange of information sharing, in particular intelligence, have to be improved; (3) the restoration of state authority and the provision of basic services is to be ensured; and (4) the promotion of development programs and mobilization of financial resources must be improved. Prof. Ndongu agreed with this, in particular that there is a lack of coordination and communication between the partners involved which ultimately led to an ‘interlocking’ of the various security initiatives in the Sahel region. At the same time, Prof. Ndongu cautioned that “maybe it is wishful thinking, but this is the only way out or way to improved stabilization strategies. As for ECOWAS, unless the principle of subsidiarity is put into practice, I don’t see any improvement when President IBK shows more interest in Sahel G5 than in ECOWAS”.

Dr. Claire Demesmay (German Council on Foreign Relations)

In her talk, Dr. Claire Demesmay touched upon the important topic of differing perceptions with regard to current (military) initiatives in the Sahel. A few years ago, she stated, French President Emmanuel Macron announced a change in relations with African countries and since then tries to build bilateral relations on an equal footing. Whereas France used to be primarily concerned with enhancing its own prestige and influence in West Africa, today, France’s self-protection is a major priority. Demesmay further asserted that French military intervention in Mali and beyond reduced violence, however, a large number of security challenges still remain. Hence, the capacity of France to settle ongoing conflicts on the ground is rather limited. Moreover, France is concerned of the rise of anti-French sentiments in West African societies and among political leaders. Therefore, the country attempts to foster joint European military operations. The new ‘Takuba task force’ is a practical example thereof, Demesmay added. But especially for Germany, the French military approach is challenging. Franco-German (military) relations have developed over the last years but should be much more enhanced, from the French perspective. Furthermore, Demesmay spoke about a number of French disappointments with regard to limited outcomes of the joint G5 force. In the French perspective, the G5 force was born out of the incapacity of ECOWAS to react properly to the crisis in Mali. In the following years, France hoped that the new G5 force will one day replace operation Barkhane. In sum, France is caught in a “*strategic trap*” at the moment – on the one hand the country tries to get out of its military domination, but on the other hand the country also tries to “avoid the worst”. With this background in mind, Demesmay finished her presentation with an outlook on the future cooperation between France and Germany in the Sahel. In her opinion, Franco-German cooperation has a lot of potential as they try to deal with complementarity threats such as migration and terrorism. Therefore, there is a “window of opportunity for enhanced cooperation between France and Germany in the future – Germany is interested, and France needs partner”.

## **Panel 4: “On the right track? Compact with Africa and Economic Partnership Agreements”**

**Key questions:** *How is the Compact with Africa (CwA) approach assessed by West African countries? Are the Compact approach and Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) reasonably and effectively complementing each other? Which substantive modifications of these two concepts are deemed particularly urgent?*

Dr. Habibu Yaya Bappah (ECOWAS Commission)

Dr. Habibu Bappah provided an insightful overview on the different logics of the CwA and the EPA-initiatives. Accordingly, the initiatives are aimed at supporting economic growth and development in Africa. He explained that the CwA-initiative is built on three pillars: private investment and financing; quality infrastructure; improving inclusive economic growth and employment. By contrast, the EPAs are essentially free trade arrangements proposed between Europe and African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. Negotiations have largely been stalled by the refusal of Nigeria (and previously Gambia) to sign up on the agreement, he added. To assess if both initiatives are on the right track, Bappah stressed that one not only needs to interrogate what has already been achieved so far, but how these initiatives are being pursued. Bappah argued that both initiatives have difficulties so far, mainly because they overlook political realities within the African states. These are characterized by limited statehood, namely the states' insufficient political and administrative capacities to enforce and implement decisions at least in some policy areas and with regard to large parts of its population. In other words, in the way initiatives were designed, the African states may not be in a position to capitalize on the opportunities presented. In conclusion, the well-intentioned economic initiatives require fundamental reforms to succeed.

Thomas Mättig (Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation)

In the workshop's last talk, Thomas Mättig critically discussed the EPAs and CwA-initiatives by starting that both are complete failures. In general, African States are not enough involved neither in the formulation nor in the implementation of these initiatives. Moreover, Europe fails to foster coherence with other big agendas and approaches that already exist. The EPAs have so far contributed mainly to the perception that the EU wants to push selfish free trade demands rather than enhancing a developmental partnership, Mättig evaluated. The impact of EPAs, however, is difficult to assess at the moment. The aim of the CwA-initiative is to increase private sector investment in Africa with a special focus on infrastructure which African governments cannot finance alone, because they do not have resources available and do not raise enough taxes. Notwithstanding that declaration, the CwA gives little attention to the specificities of many low-income countries on the continent – for example lack of jobs, poverty, insufficiently integrated economies, and low levels of industrialization. Moreover, public investments, rural credit organizations, and bank intermediation. Likewise, the commitments proposed to African countries are unlikely to be effective in stimulating a sustainable infrastructure, because institutional, banking, and liquidity prerequisites for blended finance do not yet exist in most countries.

Mättig criticized that the CwA does not even mention the role of investment in education – technical competences, vocational training, tertiary education – which many studies have identified as a main restraint to further development, including the development of local and national industries, small and medium enterprises, and their integration into industrial clusters and global and regional value chains. Moreover, the CwA deals with investors' risks, but it does not consider the environmental and social risks

potentially associated with these investments on the ground. Against this background, he doubts whether the proposed instruments adequately address the economic challenges faced by African countries and assumed that both initiatives are likely risk being ineffective. He argued that “what is missing is to see what is already there”. Apparently, Germany hopes that increased investments on the African continent will foster conditions that will incentivize Africans to stay at home, thereby mitigating the migration crisis in Europe, but as Mättig noted this strategy will not work. There is a political problem in West Africa, thus, there also should be a political solution. In conclusion, Germany and the EU: “create a problem through failed money – it just produces supplements, but no solution”.

## **Concluding Remarks / Recommendations**

Regardless of the fruitful and open discussions during the whole two days’ workshop, the outlook with regard to the future of the region and Germany’s contribution appears to be rather mixed and, thus, a lot of hard work is still required.

The international workshop leads to the following recommendations:

1. The establishment of a functioning state is considered as the most important prerequisite for stability and development in West Africa. A state that can fulfil its central functions is recognized by its citizens as legitimate. By contrast, state failure is not only a cause of structural destabilization of the states concerned, but also enriches the possibilities for terrorist and criminal networks to establish and expand their activities. Strengthening statehood is therefore a key strategy for achieving stability in the region. Apart from Mali, Burkina Faso, in particular, seems less and less able to fulfil central state functions.
2. The EU and Germany should enhance their engagement in terms of economic and technical development and the empowerment of women and girls. Greater involvement of men is needed to raise awareness and coherence of gender issues in local communities and to initiate far-reaching social change within society. Necessary changes are a long-term process that should be pursued in a conflict-sensitive manner. Economic development, poverty reduction, and empowerment of women and girls have to go hand in hand. Germany can contribute to this through targeted development cooperation and by promoting dialogue processes within African society.
3. Migration towards Europe is not a solution for better development in West Africa. Nor is sealing off Europe a solution in the EU. In its own demographic and labour market related interest, Germany should provide opportunities for legal immigration through educational cooperation and qualified access to certain groups such as in the areas of nursing and health care.
4. For almost five decades, ECOWAS has been an efficient regional organization for all of West Africa. While founded on the primary goal of economic integration, however, it very quickly expanded its activities to include security policy and foreign policy coordination. Nevertheless, ECOWAS does not yet have the military capabilities to be able to guarantee peace in West Africa without international support. Conflicts of interest between anglo- and francophone member states represent latent obstacles, however, there are possibilities for these to be overcome by a balancing and reconciliation of interests. The EU and Germany should therefore promote the strengthening of ECOWAS’ capacity to act.
5. Neither capacity-building measures nor anti-terrorism missions have so far led to significant successes in the region. Instead of expanding stability, the G5 troops had to accept further destabilization and a

massive loss of control, especially in the border regions of Burkina, Mali, and Niger. Since the force is unable to maintain their own safety, it has become a preferred target for terrorist attacks. As became clear at the summit meeting between French President Macron and the heads of state of the five G5 countries in January 2020 in Pau, France, the G5 cooperation format is in a serious crisis. Against this background, it should be examined whether the joint G5 force has not become counterproductive. There is an alternative to the G5 force via the strengthening of the military capacity of ECOWAS.

6. The Economic Partnership Agreements and the Compact with Africa are to be viewed skeptically. Despite some improvements, these economic agreements consolidate asymmetrical trade relations in favour of the EU and hinder agriculture and industrialization development in West Africa. Hence, there is a serious need for an amendment of the initiatives to create better development options for the region, the effects of which would also indirectly benefit the EU.

7. A participation of the Bundeswehr in the French-combat operations and the joint G5 force is not promising. Instead, Germany should expand its involvement within the EUTM mission – if it is reformed in agreement with the Malian government.

8. A more cooperative and coherent approach, especially in cooperation between regional and external actors, is highly recommended in terms of peace and security policy. Mutual expectations must be discussed and taken into account to a greater extent. However, measures should follow the principle ‘(West) African solutions to (West) African problems’.

## **Publication and Future Projects**

A summary publication based on this report is envisaged. It will be published on the homepages of *Helmut-Schmidt-University* (Institute of International Relations – Prof. Dr. Michael Staack), *Institute for Theology and Peace* and *West Africa Institute* and *Centre d’Etudes Diplomatiques et Stratégiques*. In this way an international attention of the results is achieved; particularly a reception in the West Africa region.

Due to the success of the first two international workshops in Berlin and Dakar, a third workshop in Berlin is already scheduled. Additionally, a fourth workshop, once more in Dakar, Senegal (in 2021), is likely to continue the process. Moreover, agreement prevailed among the workshop participants that a future institutionalization of this format beyond next years’ workshop would be highly desirable and, thus, will be subject to further planning and debate.

# Workshop- Impressions

